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Abstract 
We examine the tendency for complex ballot tasks to undermine the ability of votes to cast valid 
ballots. Specifically, we investigate whether ballot design is responsible for the high rate of 
spoiled ballots in Colombia in 2007. We address this question first by looking at data from a 
study observing the use of alternate ballot designs in a controlled environment, varying the 
information voters have when attempting to cast the ballot. We then examine the observed pattern 
of spoiled ballots in Colombia before and after the implementation of the ballot redesign tested in 
an experiment conducted in Bogotá. Our results show that there is an independent effect of the 
ballot design on the amount of spoiled ballots and that this effect correlates with certain self-
reported socio-demographic characteristics such as education. We also demonstrate that by 
improving the usability of the ballot the number of spoiled ballots drops significantly and the 
effect of socio-demographic variables become less important in explaining the presence of 
spoiled ballots. Also, aggregate results of the 2011 local elections at the municipal elections show 
a significant drop in spoiled ballots. 
 
 
  
  
Ballot Design and Invalid Votes: Evidence from Colombia 
  
 
Introduction 
While scholars of elections normally focus on voter choices and participation, an important 
amount of variation in electoral outcomes results from forms of unrecorded or “residual” votes, 
where the choices of participating voters are excluded from the electoral count. Some of these are 
“overvotes,” where a voter makes additional marks that exceed the maximum allowed. Others are 
“undervotes,” where a voter fails to mark some aspect of the ballot. When ballots are improperly 
marked in some way, they are typically considered rejected ballots and not counted, regardless of 
voter intent. These invalid votes can be highly consequential, especially in close elections such as 
that in the 2000 election in the US (Mebane 2004, Kimball et al. 2004, Leib and Dittmer 2002, 
Bullock et al. 2002) and can amount to very large numbers of votes, as in the Scottish 2007 
election (Carman et al. 2008). The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance reports that, 
among countries rated 4 or lower by Freedom House, 53 countries had at least one election with 
invalid votes exceeding 5% and 24 countries had at least one election exceeding 10%. When 
rejected ballots render invalid votes actually intended to be cast and occur in significant numbers, 
they can be especially harmful to the legitimacy of elections.   
Partly due to the tendency of these patterns to emerge in democracies facing questions of 
electoral legitimacy (Uggla 2008), many scholars have shown that invalid votes can be deliberate 
political acts, serving as a form of protest against a government or expression of apathy 
(Steifbold 1965, Zulfikarpasic 2001, Power and Garand 2007, Uggla 2008, Aldashev and 
Mastrobuoni 2010, Superti 2016, Moral 2016, Alvarez et al. 2016). Invalid votes might therefore 
reflect voters spoiling their ballots as a means to intentionally express dissatisfaction with the 
options available to them, perhaps due to a perceived lack of competition or meaningful choices.  
However, a considerable amount of research suggests that invalid votes, even on a large scale, 
can result from voter error owing to the ballot design and usability (Power and Roberts 1995, 
Carman et al 2008, Taylor 2012, Kimball and Kropf 2005, Leib and Dittmer 2002, Traugott et al 
2005, Hanmer et al. 2010, Herrnson et al 2012, Herron and Sekhon 2003) especially in the 
context of certain voter characteristics (McAllister and Makkai 1993, Kimball and Kropf 2005, 
Tomz and Van Houweling 2003, Neely and Cook 2008, Buchler et al. 2004).  While the 
comparative study of electoral systems mostly focuses on basic differences in vote allocation 
methods, each system also provides a wide array of ballot variations. Ballot designs have an 
impact on the information burden and general complexity faced by citizens (Bonneau and Loepp 
2014, Katz et al. 2010). Yet, outside of the United States, very little scholarly attention has been 
paid to the vast differences possible in the designs of ballots that affect the complexity of 
indicating voter intent, even within the same electoral system.   
  
One of the most important consequences of variations in voting technology is the effect on 
usability--how successfully voter intent is correctly understood. The information burden 
generated by the ballot may be pivotal by not providing sufficient cues in ballot design to 
translate voter preferences into informed choices. Meanwhile, voters themselves will vary in their 
levels of information about the electoral process in general, which in turn influences how 
important these cues are to behavior.  The challenge in understanding the relationship between 
these factors is the difficulty in capturing both these concepts.  
One case in which we can obtain analytical leverage on these questions is that of Colombia. In 
Colombia’s 2006 and 2010 elections, invalid votes amounted to over 13% of total votes, among 
the highest rates in the world. Colombia is a useful case for analyzing the effects of ballot design 
on invalid votes because it has used two very different ballots with the same electoral system and 
because the rate of invalid votes has been considerable. In this paper, we investigate the role of 
ballot design in explaining the high rate of invalid votes in Colombia.  We address this question 
first by looking at data from a study observing the use of alternate ballot designs in a controlled 
environment, varying the information voters have when attempting to cast the ballot. We then 
examine the observed pattern of invalid votes in Colombia before and after the implementation of 
a ballot redesign.  
Our results show that there is an independent effect of the ballot design on the amount of invalid 
votes and that the magnitude of this effect varies with self-reported socio-demographic 
characteristics. We also demonstrate that by improving the usability of the ballot, the number of 
rejected ballots drops significantly and the effect of voter characteristics is less apparent as an 
explanatory factor. We find a similar pattern in the observed electoral data when comparing the 
two elections. 
Explaining invalid votes 
Some scholars have suggested that invalid votes are sometimes political acts, protesting the 
election itself. For example, a number of early studies on this topic suggested that in systems of 
compulsory voting, invalid ballots provide the equivalent of abstention. In line with this 
reasoning, Power and Garand (2007) show that in countries with compulsory voting, there is a 
greater percentage of rejected ballots as voters use the act to vote as an opportunity to protest 
against the regime. Countries without compulsory voting may instead have lower levels of 
participation, rather than a substantial percentage of rejected ballots. Even in contexts without 
compulsory voting, it is plausible that voters would make the effort to vote and then intentionally 
spoil their ballot as part of a political statement.  
However, in other cases, research suggests that invalid votes, even on a large scale, can result 
from voter error owing to the ballot design and its usability. One part of this is the information 
burden generated by the ballot or the political sophistication of the voter.  The first aspect can be 
thought of as an institutional factor: are sufficient cues provided by ballot design to translate 
  
voter preferences into informed choices? An array of research has shown that the type of ballot 
matters for political outcomes (Alvarez et.al. 2004, 2009; Sinclair and Alvarez 2004, Herrnson et. 
al, 2008, 2012; Carman et al. 2008, Calvo et al., 2009, Katz et al. 2010).  For example, Reynolds 
and Steenberg (2006) show that the use of colors, pictures and symbols might affect the use of 
the ballot. Bonneau and Loepp (2014) present evidence that the use of party logos increases 
voting for “down ballot” races, as there are more cues voters can rely on. Another example can be 
found in Matson and Fine (2006), who found that the positioning of candidates and offices within 
the same ballot can affect participation in those races.  Kimball and Kropf (2005) perform a 
large-scale study of US ballot designs and show a systematic relationship with the patterns of 
unrecorded votes.   
Another aspect of this question regards the characteristics of voters themselves – such as their 
levels of information and/or degree of political sophistication – which can increase the 
importance of clear instructions and cues on ballots.  McAllister and Makkai (1993), for instance, 
find that Australian invalid votes are a result not of protest, but of the linguistic difficulty faced 
by certain populations. Kimball and Kropf (2005) for instance, find that invalid votes in US 
presidential elections are related to disparities in ballot design. Moreover, US scholars have often 
found that ballot design regulates whether demographic features correlate with rejected ballots 
(Tomz and Van Houweling 2003, Kimball and Kropf 2005, Knack and Kropf, 2003; Sinclair and 
Alvarez, 2004).  In Brazil, Power and Roberts (1995) argue that “open list” ballots in particular – 
where individual candidates are selected from party lists – can be problematic as they may 
demand higher levels of sophistication and information from voters. Open lists require voters to 
evaluate ballots with choices to cast a vote for an individual across many lists of candidates from 
various parties. These lists are as big as the number of available seats in the district. With a high 
number of seats in districts (district magnitude), as in Colombia, open lists especially increase the 
potential for complexity, especially among voters with lower levels of political information, 
interest or sophistication. 
 
Electoral and Ballot Reform in Colombia 
The electoral ballot in Colombia, prepared by the electoral National Civil Registry2, was 
first introduced in Colombia in the late 1980s3 and was amended twice after approval of the 2003 
Political Reform4, which instituted the option for parties to use open list proportional 
representation, where voters rank candidates and seats are assigned within parties based on those 
ranks. Prior to the reform, Colombia employed a nominally closed list system that, in practice, 
functioned as a “personal list” system (Carey and Shugart 1995), analogous to individual 
                                                          
2 This function is performed by the Registrar's Office for Electoral Processes.  
3 Prior to this era, ballots were provided directly by parties, rather than administered by the government. See Taylor 
(2012) for a detailed history of Colombian ballots.  
4 Legislative Act 01 of 2003. 
  
candidates running in districts alone under de facto plurality rules. Reinforcing the emphasis on 
personalism during this era, the ballot design depicted the photos and names of all candidates 
without differentiating by parties or type of district (the reserved seats in Congress for indigenous 
movements or Afro-Colombian descendants).  The first 2003 ballot design for local elections 
removed the pictures, kept the names, and organized candidates by party affiliation, shown in 
Figure 1. In the first election after the reform, the percentage of rejected ballots was largely 
unchanged, at 4-5% (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil).  Nonetheless, keeping the entire 
candidate name on the ballot was considered nonviable for national elections for the considerably 
larger number of candidates in the Senate and House, and the existence of multiple districts.  
For the 2006 national elections, a new ballot design was implemented that included two sections: 
one with party logos and names, and another with numbers that were assigned to each candidate, 
and removed the names of candidates. Voters would have to memorize the party logo and name 
as well as the number of the candidate within the party list in order to vote effectively. This 
design is shown in Figure 2.5   
Figure 2 about here 
In the subsequent elections, there was a dramatic increase in rejected ballots. Nationally, the 
percentage of invalid votes for the election of House was 4.23% in 2002, then 13.12% in 2006 
and finally 14.4% in 2010. This allowed many to question the legitimacy of the elections, as 
about a tenth of the votes across the country were considered invalid.  
To determine whether ballot design – rather than protest behavior or intrinsic properties of the 
“open list” electoral system itself – was responsible for these patterns, we coordinated with the 
National Registry to conduct a study to assess the usability of the ballot in comparison to 
alternative designs. First, we sought to analyze a random sample of the votes for the Council of 
Bogotá in 2007. Second, we conducted a study in Bogotá allowing subjects to simulate use of a 
new ballot designed to correct problems found in the 2007 election. We first report on the results 
of this analysis and then compare these findings to the subsequent use of the ballot in practice in 
local council elections. 
 
Patterns of rejected ballots: The Bogotá Municipal Council Elections 2007 
Our first concern was to clarify the types errors made in practice in 2007. Did invalid ballots 
appear to be attempts to indicate a preference or deliberate attempts to protest the election? To 
get at this question, we first obtained permission to examine a random sample of 18,278 ballots 
that were cast in the elections for the Council of Bogotá in 2007, which used the design shown in 
                                                          
5 Note that the ballot was divided the department level constituencies and minority seats elected 
via a national constituency. For the local elections discussed below, there would be only one 
district per ballot. 
  
Figure 3.   
Figure 3 about here 
Here we can observe actual votes, which allows us to differentiate between “types” of invalid 
votes. Among these were 1362 invalid votes - a rate of 7.48%, which is close to that reported for 
the entire set for this council--7.27%. This sample was chosen randomly and produced the results 
in Table 1.  
Table 1 about here 
The Table highlights two groups of factors driving rejected ballots. The first group corresponding 
to row 1 shows that the most common voting error was choosing a candidate without choosing a 
party: 71.15% of cases. These voters likely intended to cast a ballot for a candidate. The second 
most common group involved potentially deliberate efforts at invalidating the ballot, either by 
making an invalid mark or by marking several parties. This behavior accounted for 18.8% of the 
ballots rendered invalid in the sample. Only 4.70% of the rejected ballots in the sample clearly 
spoil the ballot by marking all areas of the ballot or just using the ballot clearly to express their 
discontent. This sample also included another form of residual vote that is clearly an intentional 
protest, the “blank vote” that represents an explicit “none of the above” option. In this sample, the 
percentage of blank votes per locality was 12.36%.  
The patterns observed in this sample of cast ballots suggest that most rejected ballots probably 
resulted from unintentional errors. This pattern may suggest that many citizens treated the ballot 
similarly to the earlier candidate-only electoral system, despite the ballot and rule changes. This 
tendency to continue such behavior in the face of the new system suggests that the ballot failed to 
clarify the process of selecting choices to translate voter preferences.6  
Because of the potential for usability problems, the Registraduría agreed to pilot an alternative 
ballot. This ballot, shown in Figure 4a, created a separate area for each party presenting 
candidates in the district instead of two separate sections for parties and candidate numbers, as 
was the case in the 2007 and 2010 elections. This eliminated the need to mark two separate areas 
or to have the same set of identifying numbers for candidates of all parties. 
In the new ballot design, the requirement to choose both a party and a candidate was abandoned 
and the choice was replaced with a simplified method in which voters need only select their 
candidate. The party preference is a byproduct of this choice, as each selection is made within the 
                                                          
6 The situation was even worse for national elections, in which voters had to, in addition to 
marking the party and candidate’s number, choose between a national district and a special 
national constituency for indigenous communities, and for the House, the department level 
district, or a national reserved seat for the indigenous communities or two reserved seats from 
Afro-Colombian descendants.  
  
area designated for a party. The redesign of the ballot should therefore have enabled voters to 
better translate their preferences into a selection of a candidate or a party.  
Although this design simplifies choices in general, the ballot design should primarily affect 
populations with the most sensitivity to usability issues. The greater the effort and information 
burden required to use the ballot, the more difficulty we would expect for those most susceptible 
to these usability problems, such as less educated or politically sophisticated citizens, resulting in 
a greater tendency to make mistakes using the ballot.  The subsequent design, by simplifying its 
use, should have reduced the disparities between these groups and made demographic 
characteristics less important in explaining the propensity of voters to produce invalid votes.   
An Experiment in Bogotá  
To test the differences across the ballots and isolate the role of the ballot in producing the effects, 
we conducted an experiment based on the Bogotá Council elections that varied ballot design and 
the instructions given to voters and assessed aspects of voters such as age, sex, level of electoral 
participation, socioeconomic status, and education level.  One ballot design was based on that 
used in 2007 (that shown in Figure 3), while the second was based on a proposed alternative to be 
used in 2011 (that shown in Figure 4a).  The study was conducted with the support of the 
National Registry on March 17, 18, and 22, 2011.  
The voting simulations were conducted in the auxiliary registration offices of the Colombian 
capital. These offices are responsible for issuing all records and credentials relating to identity 
and elections. Because virtually all Colombians make use of these services, a sample producing 
variation by gender, age, and socioeconomic status of the larger electorate was obtained. Student 
volunteers gave visitors the survey, randomly assigning individuals to receive a version of the 
Bogotá council ballot (2007 or 2011) and a set of instructions.  Overall, 1,257 individuals 
participated in the simulations described below.  See Annex 1 for descriptive statistics on the 
sample. Volunteers were instructed to ask everyone that entered the registration offices to 
participate.  
The randomly-assigned instructions were to simulate the actual voting intention and allow 
variation across which type of intent corresponds to which type of error (See Annex 1 to see the 
sample described by type of instruction). The first group of instructions we examine, Candidate 
Number, gave the subject the candidate number as well as either the party logo or the names of 
parties.  A second set of instructions, Name Only, used the name of the party and the name of a 
particular candidate without the number. The Candidate Number instructions more closely 
simulate the typical level of information where voters are aware of the candidates’ numbers, 
while the Name Only instructions deals with the possibility of voters without this information 
being forced to find it on the spot using only materials provided on site. In this case, the subject 
needed to search the number of the candidate in a booklet similar to that provided by the National 
Registry in the election booth. 
  
Results of Simulation  
To show the results regarding the ballot types and test the conditioning effects of the self-reported 
socio-demographic characteristics on the effective use of the ballot, we use a probit model in 
which the dependent variable was a dummy variable identifying whether the subject cast an 
invalid ballot.  As independent variables, we created dummies for the instruction categories just 
described. In the first model, we simply examine the effect of the ballot. In the second and third 
models we interact ballot with the level of education reported by the subject, divided into higher 
education and lower categories. In the third model we add a series of interactions with the type of 
instruction, which were grouped into the categories Candidate Number (which also included 
party information), and the Name Only instruction, in which voters had to consult additional 
materials to cast the ballot. 
Table 2 about here 
Table 2 shows that the new ballot does overall reduce the probability of spoiling the ballot. The 
new design clearly improves usability compared to the 2007 ballot. To better observe the 
difference, Figure 5 displays the predicted values (from Model 1) in the differences in probability 
of spoiling the ballot differentiating by ballot type, showing a decline from 16.7% in 2007 to 
2.5% in the 2011 ballot.  
Figure 5 about here 
Figure 6 displays the predicted values from Model 2, examining the ballot effect between the two 
categories of education of which the lowest category represents those subjects with secondary 
education or less, and the upper category represents subjects with at least some college 
(technical/university) education.  
Figure 6 about here 
For the 2007 ballot, education is important in explaining the probability of spoiling the ballot. 
The 2011 ballot, by contrast, is used more effectively by all users. At low levels of education, the 
difference between the two ballot designs is stark – with a difference of 4.1% to 21.1% in the 
lowest category. While the gap narrows in the higher education group, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the ballot types within both groups. 
While education level has an effect overall, we also want to observe how the instructions (the 
information given to the subject) influenced the outcome. Figure 7 displays the results of Model 
3, differentiated by type of instruction.   
Figure 7 about here 
As described above, the first category of instructions gave the subject the number of the 
candidate, along with either the logo or the party name. The second set of instructions gave only 
  
the name of the candidate and name of the party, which required the use of a booklet to determine 
the candidate’s number and party logo. When the data is divided to these types two type of 
instructions, we see the pattern associated with the effect of education on the larger sample, 
showing that with the 2007 ballot the chances of spoiling the ballot were significantly higher than 
for subjects assigned the 2011 ballot.  With our second set of instructions, the subject had to 
search into other material to find out the number of the candidate. This was intended to simulate a 
lower level of information than voters typically possess, though it also has the effect of drawing 
additional attention to details of the process. The results are generally similar although the 
difference across education groups is somewhat more stark with the 2011 ballot and less 
differentiated with the 2007 ballot, compared to the other instructions.  
 
Observed Outcomes: 2007 and 2011 Municipal Council Results Compared 
The results from the experiment above formed the basis for the National Registry’s decision to 
implement the new 2011 ballot for the October elections, which included minor changes to the 
design used in the study just described (shown in Figure 4b).7   
That same year, in October, the new ballot with the improved design made its first public 
appearance for the elections of local authorities.  This enables us to examine whether the 
applications of both ballots reflects the expectations above.   
In this context, however, we are limited to aggregate data, which forces us to rely on very indirect 
measures of general voter characteristics. We use the municipality as the unit of observation and 
the percentage of rejected ballots as the dependent variable. We make use of the urbanization rate 
as a proxy for social and political dynamics that could have an effect on the probability of 
spoiling a ballot, which may roughly correspond to the degree of familiarity with the party 
system and electoral process. As a result, we expect that rural areas are likely to have voters more 
vulnerable to ballot usability issues. This is the main focus of our investigation below.  
We also include control variables that might have a potential effect on the context of voting, 
especially ones that could motivate protest or contribute to voter apathy. First, due to the 
particular circumstances of political conflict in Colombia, we included a rate of homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants. Particularly if protest motivations drive ballot behavior, we might expect 
that violence would increase the potential for frustration with the political system and thus lead to 
more invalid votes. Second, we also include measures to capture the competitiveness of the 
mayoral race, which is held concurrently and more salient than the councilors race. These also 
might be related to contexts where protest activity might be expected due to elections in dominant 
political machines or otherwise lacking viable competitors, following the reasoning of work such 
                                                          
7 It included a larger illustrated instruction section as well as letters to the left of party logos to facilitate counting the 
ballots. 
  
as Uggla (2008).  For that purpose, we added the winning margin (as a percentage) between the 
winner and the first loser for the mayoral race. Our intuition was that when there exists more 
certainty over the election result – reflected in a higher margin between candidates -- citizens 
may not participate as actively in political choices as in politically competitive environments race 
with multiple strong candidates. Further, we include the effective number of candidates per seat 
at the municipal level for the council election, which partly accounts for the complexity of the 
context (Power and Garand 2007; Tomsa and Ofen 2013, p. 82).  A more fragmented system 
could increase the number of potentially relevant and visible candidates voters would have to 
consider.  
Finally, we also examine a model with the same covariates using “blank votes” – the explicit 
protest option Colombia includes on the ballot -- as an alternate dependent variable for 
comparison to invalid votes. In Colombia, as noted above, blank votes are officially allowed, 
counted and reported. For many citizens interested in protest activity, this is known to serve as an 
explicit demonstration of discontent (Caicedo, 2015, p.63).8 This allows us to compare the effect 
the ballot (and other variables) on this more clear-cut pattern of protest activity, relative to the 
effect on invalid votes.  If invalid votes are also related to protest activity, we would expect 
somewhat similar results for key variables when comparing the same models applied to blank 
votes. 
The three models are reported in Table 3. We use department fixed effects to account for the 
possibility that there could be regional characteristics of local politics that could influence the 
baseline tendencies in each department, and cluster on municipality. The first column shows the 
model of rejected ballots including the variables above. To observe the differences in our variable 
of interest before and after the reform, the variables are interacted with a dummy for the 2011 
ballot in the second model (Column 2).  The third column shows the same model with blank 
votes as the dependent variable. 
Table 3 about here 
Our first result confirms again that the 2011 ballot lead to fewer invalid votes, on average, with a 
2.75 percentage point decrease of invalid votes between 2007 and 2011—about 38% fewer. 
Second, the urban percent of the population clearly decreases the number of invalid votes overall. 
In the next model, the interactions show a stark difference with regard to the effect of this 
demographic factor. The negative relationship -- more urban municipalities having fewer invalid 
votes – is seen in 2007 but this difference disappears in 2011 after the ballot redesign. A plot of 
the predicted values of this relationship showing the difference between the 2007 and 2011 
                                                          
8 As illustrated by Caicedo (2015), in some mayoral races, blank votes have surpassed the votes 
of candidates. Due to existing legislation, those races need have to be rescheduled with a new set 
of candidates (Caicedo 2015).  
 
  
ballots are depicted in Figure 8 (Table 3, Model 2).  
Figure 8 about here 
The linear prediction shows that for the 2007 election the proportion of invalid votes was higher 
in the more rural municipalities, at around 8.05% compared to 6.0% for the urban municipalities.  
The introduction of the new ballot in 2011 made a significant change in the overall proportion of 
invalid votes, lowering its average to 4.43%. Further, with the 2011 ballot there is no statistically 
significant effect of the degree of urbanness, suggesting the demographic factors captured by this 
variable were no longer present.  
The effective number of candidates per seat meanwhile slightly decreases the number of null 
votes. This is contrary to expectations, though the interaction model shows that this effect was 
also not present in 2011. Less competitive mayoral elections had no statistically significant effect 
on the number of invalid votes overall. A weak negative effect for this variable in 2007 was not 
present in 2011. In addition, there is positive association between violence (homicide rate) and 
invalid votes, however the interaction model suggests that the effect does not vary between the 
two elections.  
Finally, we conduct an additional analysis in which use the same model with the percentage of 
blank votes as the dependent variable as, reported in Column 3. As noted above, these blank 
votes serve as a straightforward opportunity to cast a protest vote for voters not intending to make 
a choice.  First we note that there is no statistically significant difference between 2007 and 2011. 
While the 2011 ballot was negatively correlated and significant for invalid votes, this relationship 
does not hold for blank votes. Second, as shown in Figure 9, and the effect of urban population 
has the opposite effect for blank votes, compared to invalid votes. Although there is a small 
statistically significant difference between the years in the magnitude of this effect, the figure 
illustrates that there is substantial difference compared to 2007. 
Figure 9 about here 
In summary, while invalid votes diminish with urban proportion only with the 2007 ballot (as we 
would expect given the usability hypothesis), blank vote proportions increase with urbanness at 
roughly the same rate in both years. This is what we would expect given that active protest 
balloting should be associated with the higher political sophistication or awareness one would 
expect in urban areas. In addition, this is consistent with Caicedo’s (2015) finding that voters in 
“cosmopolitan” areas tend to mobilize protests using this method.   
Concluding Points 
Our results suggest that how an electoral system functions is partly a result of the ballot design. 
Here, we focus on tendency for complex ballot tasks to undermine the ability of votes to cast 
valid ballots. Our findings suggest that the introduction of a combined party and candidate 
component to the ballot in an environment where pure candidate votes were the norm 
  
exacerbated the detrimental effects that the open list reform had on voter’s ability to make their 
vote count. The 2011 ballot design, which nested candidate choice within party dramatically 
reduced the tendency for subjects in simulated conditions to produce invalid votes simply by 
making the process more consistent with the information required under the candidate-only ballot 
previously used. We also find that lower education and higher age groups were likely 
disproportionately affected by the usability weakness of the 2007 ballot. Examining the actual 
results in this light, we see some evidence that the basic effect of reducing these disparities has 
likely occurred in practice. In addition to the fact that the average proportion of invalid votes 
reduced markedly from 2007 to 2011, a measurable disparity between more rural and urban 
municipalities found 2007 was no longer present in 2011. Moreover, there is no clear evidence 
that protest voting motivated these votes in either election, though there is some evidence that 
casting blank votes may have served this role in both elections. 
Invalid votes driven by usability factors mean that voters are effectively excluded from political 
participation. Normatively, maximizing usability means that all voters count without undue 
burdens and without bias against certain populations, such as the less educated. Removing such 
bias increases the legitimacy of elections and improves equality of influence in democracy. 
Overall, extrapolating from the 2007 council data, as many as 260,000 additional votes would 
have been wasted if the same proportion of invalid votes had occurred in 2011. Although we do 
not investigate the political consequences here, we do establish that the effects were likely 
concentrated on the less educated citizens and perhaps other less politically sophisticated groups. 
This implies that, at a minimum, the removal of these votes from the process lead to systematic 
underrepresentation of certain views in society and could therefore bias political outcomes.  
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Table 1. Rejected Ballots Divided by Type of Use 
Rejected ballots divided by type of use  Rejected ballots 
Frequency % 
1. Voter does not choose a party, and only chooses a candidate number  969 71.2% 
2. Voter marks more than one party logos, no number of candidate 256 18.8% 
3. Voter marks all areas 64 4.7% 
4. Other types of marks that spoil the ballot 73 5.4% 
Total 1362 100% 
Source: Authors, sample taken from the Council Election in Bogotá, 2007. Sample was chosen 
across localities in Bogotá. 
 
 
  
  
Table 2. Simulation Results, Probit Estimates 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Invalid vote Edu. Interactions Edu./Instruc/Interac             
    
2011 Ballot -0.981*** -0.934*** -1.002*** 
 (0.120) (0.150) (0.213) 
Higher Education  -0.345*** -0.423** 
  (0.124) (0.167) 
2011 Ballot*Higher Education  -0.173 0.0167 
  (0.260) (0.337) 
Instruction Name only   -0.122 
   (0.164) 
2011*Name only   0.153 
   (0.302) 
Higher Ed*Name only   0.180 
   (0.251) 
2011*Higher.Ed*Name only   -0.493 
   (0.555) 
    
    
Constant -0.965*** -0.809*** -0.758*** 
 (0.0609) (0.0809) (0.106) 
    
Observations 1,257 1,253 1,253 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 3. Model to test the Effect of the Ballot on Invalid votes, Council Results 2007-2011 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Invalid votes Invalid Votes 
Interactions 
Blank votes 
    
2011 Ballot -2.757*** -4.846*** -0.0644 
 (0.0625) (0.301) (0.210) 
Urban Proportion   -0.578*** -1.336*** 3.566*** 
     (0.205)  (0.239) (0.166) 
2011 Ballot*Urban proportion  1.582*** 0.661*** 
  (0.232) (0.222) 
ENEC per seat -0.156** -0.383*** -0.183*** 
 (0.0625) (0.0914) (0.0471) 
2011 Ballot*ENEC per seat  0.393*** -0.0315 
  (0.0846) (0.0605) 
Winning margin      -0.178 -0.717* 0.139 
 (0.300)  (0.425) (0.257) 
2011 Ballot*Winning margin  1.008* -0.231 
  (0.593) (0.404) 
Homicide rate    3.727*** 2.875** -0.875 
 (1.265) (1.424) (0.755) 
2011 Ballot*Homicide rate  1.616 -0.315 
  (1.246) (0.971) 
 
 
Department Effects 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
Constant 9.085*** 10.16*** 1.127*** 
 (0.246) (0.317) (0.163) 
    
Observations 1,947 1,946 1,946 
R-squared 0.517 0.533 0.500 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
  
Appendix 
 
Table A1: Sample of Participants Divided by Locality and Type of Ballot 
 
Locality              Ballot 
 2007 2011 
Suba 74 71 
Usaquén 99 92 
San Cristóbal 16 25 
Teusaquillo 80 82 
Candelaria 226 231 
Tunjuelito 21 35 
Kennedy 19 31 
Chapinero 64 81 
Fontibón 97 101 
Puente Aranda 32 30 
Oficinas 
Centrales 92 97 
Total 820 876 
 
 
Table A2. Simulated Ballot by Type of Instruction and Type of Ballot 
Type of Instruction 2007 % 2011 % Total 
            
Number of Candidate 334 55.85 351 53.26 685 
            
Name of Candidate 264 44.15 308 46.74 572 
Total 598   659   1257 
*Additional participants that were involved in two other activities designed to simulate closed list 
and blank voting were not included in the analysis.  
 
Experiment Sample: Socio-demographic Characteristics 
Table A3. Sample Differentiated by Sex 
  2007 % 2011 % Total % 
Male 252 42.1 308 46.7 560 44.6 
Female 346 57.9 351 53.3 697 55.4 
Total 598   659   1257   
 
  
Table A4. Sample Differentiated by Self-Reported Economic Strata 
  2007 % 2011 % Total % 
1 (Lowest 
income) 
30 5.2 48 7.4 78 6.3 
2 156 26.8 193 29.7 349 28.3 
3 244 41.9 250 38.5 494 40.1 
4 125 21.4 107 16.5 232 18.8 
5 16 2.7 36 5.5 52 4.2 
6 (Highest 
income) 
12 2.1 15 2.3 27 2.2 
Total 583   649   1232   
 
Table A5. Sample Differentiated by Age Group 
  2007 % 2011 % Total % 
18-25 193 32.3 227 34.5 420 33.4 
26-35 147 24.6 135 20.5 282 22.4 
36-45 110 18.4 124 18.8 234 18.6 
46-55 85 14.2 108 16.4 193 15.3 
56 or more 63 10.5 65 9.9 128 10.2 
Total 598   659   1257   
       
 
Table A6. Sample Differentiated by Educational Attainment 
  2007 % 2011 % Total % 
First category             
   Primary 43 7.2 44 6.7 87 6.9 
   High School 263 44.1 276 42.0 539 43.0 
Second category           
   Technical 111 18.6 122 18.6 233 18.6 
   University 130 21.8 162 24.7 292 23.3 
   Grad. Studies 49 8.2 53 8.1 102 8.1 
Total 596   657   1253   
 
Table A7. Sample Differentiated by Total Valid and Invalid Votes, Simulation by Type of Ballot 
 
  2007 % 2011 % Total 
Valid votes 498 83.3% 642 97.4% 1140 
Invalid 
votes 100 16.7% 17 2.6% 117 
Total 598   659   1257 
Source: Elaborated by the authors 
 
  
 
Figure 1: First Ballot Design Used after the 2003 Reform, Concejo de Medellín 
  
Text: A voter wishes to vote for candidate #3 from Party 1 (Mario Aguirre Arias, from party 
Colombia Viva). The expected way to cast the vote would be to put a mark over the party name 
or number 1, and another mark over the number 3 or the candidate’s name. Nonetheless, the voter 
could also mark only the name or candidate’s number, or even just the party’s name or number to 
cast a valid vote.  
 
  
 
Figure 2: Second Ballot Design (2006), National Elections. Ballot for the House of 
Representatives, Antioquia. 
  
Text Figure 2: In House elections, the voter must choose between part A, B or C. To cast a valid 
vote for candidate #106 from the Liberal Party, for example, the voter should put a mark over the 
party logo, and another mark over the number #106. The voter could also mark only the party 
logo. Invalid votes usually occur from only marking a number without marking the party logo, or 
marking multiple sections.  In section B there are only party logos, because there is only one seat 
to allocate. 
 
 
Figure 3: Second Ballot Design (2007), local elections. Concejo de Bogotá (Used 
for the simulation) 
 
Text Figure 3: To cast a valid vote for candidate #17 from the Movimiento Alas Equipo 
Colombia, the voter should put a mark over the party logo, and another mark over the number 
#17. The voter could also mark only the party logo. Invalid votes usually occur from only 
marking a number without marking the party logo. 
 
  
 
Figure 4a: Third Ballot Design (2011), local elections, Concejo de Bogotá (Used for the 
simulation) 
  
Text Figure 4a: To cast a valid vote for candidate #17 from the Liberal Party, the voter is 
expected to put a mark over the party logo, and another mark over the number #17. The voter 
could also mark only the party logo, or the number of the candidate within the party designated 
area. 
 
  
 
Figure 4b: Third Ballot Design, as used in 2011Text Figure 4b: To cast a valid vote for candidate 
#17 from the Liberal Party, the voter is expected to put a mark over the party logo, and another 
  
mark over the number #17. The voter could also mark only the party logo, or the number of the 
candidate within the party designated area. 
  
  
 
  
Figure 5: Probability of Spoiling the Ballot, by Ballot Type (2007-2011) 
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Figure 6: Level of Self-Reported Education and Probability of Spoiling the Ballot, by Ballot Type 
(2007-2011) 
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Figure 7: Level of Self-Reported Education and Probability of Spoiling the Ballot per instruction, 
by Ballot Type (2007-2011) 
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Figure 8: Proportion of Urban Population and the Predicted amount of Invalid Ballots, by Ballot 
Type (2007-2011) 
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Figure 9: Proportion of Urban Population and the Predicted amount of Blank Ballots, by Ballot 
Type (2007-2011) 
 
 
